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RECLAIMING THE SENTENCES:  
A LINGUISTIC LOCI APPROACH TO DOCTRINE 
 
Risto Saarinen 
 
 
The contemporary discussion on the so-called linguistic understanding of doctrine, 
initiated by George Lindbeck in the 1980s, has largely come to the following 
conclusions: (a) although we may criticize a merely propositional understanding of 
doctrine, we cannot move beyond propositions. Propositions remain necessary but not 
sufficient constituents of linguistic utterances. (b) The speech-act theory, inspired by 
Wittgenstein and formulated by Austin and Searle, has permanent value for the 
understanding of religious doctrine. By means of this theory theologians can identify 
important aspects of those linguistic utterances which are considered to be doctrines. 
(c) The linguistic approaches to doctrine lead to postliberal theologies which 
emphasize and even justify the ecclesial and traditionalist nature of doctrinal 
formulations.
1
 
 
The strong tendency of many theologians to prove (c)
2
 often neglects the very complex 
nature of (a) and (b). A reader of such approaches receives the impression that the 
authors primarily want to establish (c) by means of (a) and (b). As a result of this 
interest, the complex linguistic claims (a) and (b) do not receive proper sophistication 
but are seen, rather, in terms of the author’s over-arching canonical and ecclesial 
interest. Therefore, the understanding of language per se often remains superficial in 
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postliberal theories.  Although they argue that the evidence provided by linguistics 
allegedly supports their theological conclusions, there is no generally approved and 
clearly argued connection that leads from (a) and (b) to (c).  
 
Is it possible to construct a linguistic approach to doctrine without adopting the 
traditionalist underpinnings of (c)?  Leaving out (c), one could argue that (a) and (b) 
already contain the building blocks which can establish a fruitful linguistic approach to 
religious doctrine. This is precisely what the present paper argues. Through taking very 
seriously the linguistic points expressed in (a) and (b) an approach to doctrine can be 
constructed which need not be traditionalist in its outlook.  The approach can rather be 
characterized as modern and it can integrate not only canonical but also historical-
critical modes of reading the Scripture. This procedure need not, however, lead to a 
merely rationalistic picture of religious doctrine. The present paper will show how 
linguistic utterances in themselves incorporate the resources to speak about the 
mysteries of faith. They may do so even better than in postliberal theories, since many 
postliberals locate the mystery to the social and cultural context of the church rather 
than to the text as a linguistic entity.   
 
Leaving most theological considerations for the final section, the present paper begins 
with a strong focus on contemporary linguistics. A brief look at some basic concepts of 
semantics will lead to the quest for a fresh linguistic approach to religious doctrine. 
Another guide in this quest is provided by the so-called loci method, as developed by 
the early modern language-oriented theologians Erasmus of Rotterdam and Philip 
Melanchthon. After a brief presentation of their method, the paper proceeds to outline a 
“linguistic loci approach to doctrine”. Finally, the paper discusses briefly the relative 
importance of exegetics in linguistic theories of doctrine. 
 
Propositions and Sentences 
 
                                                                                                                                              
dimensions of postliberal theology remain undiscussed. 
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Pieter A. M. Seuren’s Language in Cognition3  serves as my first guide and handmaid 
in the quest. This new study of semantics does not discuss religious language, but it 
nevertheless creates an informative linguistic background to the claims (a) and (b). 
Seuren believes that the semantic analysis of linguistic utterances consists of two 
components, namely, the speech-act operator and the propositional content.  Relying 
on speech-act theory, Seuren argues that the primary task of language is not 
information transfer but social binding. For this reason, propositions need to be seen in 
connection with the socially binding force involved in linguistic utterances.
4
 This 
interest connects his semantic project with the claims of many postliberals. 
 
In some important respects, however, Seuren differs from postliberal theologians. 
Although he follows Austin and Searle, he does not consider Wittgenstein as a serious 
linguist.
5
 For Seuren, the speech-act theory does not belong to pragmatics but to 
semantics. This means that the socially binding forces are already operative on the 
level of individual sentences. As the primary units of semantics are lexical meanings 
and sentence meanings, not larger narratives, Seuren’s analysis focuses on sentences. 
He also believes in the power of modern and classical logic in analysing sentence 
meanings, as propositional sentences are the bearers of truth values. Given this focus, 
Seuren does not need to employ narrative theories or pragmatics to argue that socially 
binding forces determine meaning.
6
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For Seuren, the socially binding force as the primary function of language is not only 
opposed to propositionalism but also to the communicative function of language in 
general.
7
 While postliberals tend to play propositionalism against more communicative 
views of doctrine,
8
 Seuren considers that communication typically operates with 
propositions. The primary social binding manifested in speech-acts, however, precedes 
propositional content.
9
 
 
Another difference between Seuren and postliberals is found in the claim of 
cognitivism: Seuren maintains that the mental or cognitive level of understanding must 
be assumed and kept distinct from the level of language.
10
 The event in the speaker’s 
mind is called intent. It consists of two parts: the definition of the socially binding 
force (e.g. question, command, etc.) and the mental proposition. In language, the 
mental proposition receives a linguistic shape, but the socially binding force is only 
sometimes explicitly expressed as speech-act operator.
11
 
 
Although Seuren does not consider propositional communication as being primary, he 
emphatically holds that linguistic utterances express propositions.
12
  In defining the 
nature of a proposition, Seuren proceeds from Aristotle’s definition that a proposition 
“says something of something”.13 According to his definition, “a proposition is the 
here-and-now (token) mental act of assigning a property to one or more actual or 
virtual objects (entities)”.14 Propositions are thus mental rather than linguistic entities. 
They do not primarily express universal types but occasional, unrepeatable tokens. 
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Seuren points out that the linguistic shapes of propositions are often read and 
understood as types, although the speaker performs a token-level mental act.
15
 
 
To understand a linguistic utterance correctly, the listener should connect the type-level 
linguistic appearances of propositions to the mental token proposition intended by the 
speaker. In such a process, listeners relate the proposition to its context (so-called 
anchoring) and to the intention of the speaker (so-called keying). Propositions are in 
this sense “contextually anchored and intentionally keyed”, although their linguistic 
shape may look like a universal type. Seuren calls this universal linguistic shape “L-
proposition”.  While the semantic analysis of a sentence consists of grasping the L-
proposition and the speech-act operator, one also needs to apply the mental processes 
of keying and anchoring to understand the proposition properly. Without anchoring, an 
L-proposition has a meaning, but well-anchored L-propositions have also an 
interpretation.
16
 The present paper uses the concepts of meaning and interpretation in 
this manner. 
 
Inside the proposition we have a difference which has made history in linguistics: “A 
proposition consists of two terms, a predicate and a subject term.”17 For the present 
paper, the distinction between subject and predicate is the crucial tool which enables 
the construction of a linguistic approach to doctrine. While many postliberals treat 
propositions bluntly, the present paper performs a deconstruction of the proposition 
and claims that, to understand religious propositions properly, their subjects needs to 
be treated differently from their predicates. This project of deconstruction starts with a 
specification of six linguistic features relevant to these two constituents of a 
proposition.   
 
First, all properties that are assigned to the subject in question, can be called predicates. 
In the sentence / proposition “John runs fast” the subject is “John” and the predicate 
“runs fast”. In the sentence / proposition “The house is red”, the subject is “the house” 
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and the predicate “is red”. As a mental rather than a linguistic term, the subject can be 
called “object” or even “entity”. We will, however, use the linguistic term “subject”. 
 
Second, the subject is primary or has a “lower order” than the predicate. In the sentence 
“John runs fast”, “John” is logically a zero-order individual entity, while “runs fast” is 
a first-order class which takes as its extension a number of zero-order individual 
entities that belong to this class.
18
 Such logical primacy of the subject does not mean 
that it is better known than the predicate. On the contrary, propositions very often aim 
at characterizing a relatively unknown subject by means of assigning familiar 
properties to it. However, in order to assign a property to “something”, this subject 
must already be assumed and has a lower order or semantic primacy in this sense. The 
claim that a proposition contains two semantic orders already revises Lindbeck’s view 
of the “first-order” proposition.19 
 
Third, grammatical subject and predicate do not always correspond to the mental level 
of propositions. If I ask: “Who caught the thief” and you answer: “The policeman 
caught the thief”, “the policeman” is the grammatical subject, but in the logic of 
discourse “catching the thief” is the actual topic which is elucidated by assigning “the 
policeman” to it. Such observations have triggered extensive discussions on the so-
called topic and comment and the ways in which they correspond to subject and 
predicate.
20
 The present paper employs a simplified model as follows: in spite of 
varying token-level discourses, the mental proposition and its linguistic expression (L-
proposition) employ a “topical subject” which is elucidated by means of assigning 
predicates to it. While the L-proposition expresses the topical subject as a type rather 
than token, the speech-act operators and other token-level markers should enable its 
keying and anchoring to the occasion relevant in the discourse. When you answer: “the 
policeman caught the thief”, I am supposed to understand which particular thief is 
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meant, although the L-proposition does not specify it. In this manner my interpretation 
of your answer grasps both the socially binding forces involved and the L-proposition. 
 
Fourth, we need to make a consistent distinction between sentence and proposition. 
Sentences are linguistic entities; their token-level surface structure expresses the L-
proposition and speech-act operators, which together constitute the semantic analysis 
of the sentence. Both speakers and listeners employ keying and anchoring to interpret 
the sentences. Thus the sentence “the policeman caught the thief” can be interpreted to 
contain a question-answer speech act which presupposes a singular occasion. The 
sentence also contains an L-proposition in which “catching the thief” is assumed to be 
the topical subject. Such a view does not move speech acts to the level of pragmatics, 
but they are semantic constituents of sentences. The L-propositions remain important 
constituents of sentences but they also differ from sentences. Fundamentally, 
propositions are mental and sentences linguistic entities. The L-propositions available 
in the sentences need to be cognitively interpreted in the light of intent, context and 
socially binding forces. The speech-act operators are sometimes marked already in the 
language (as question mark, through phrases like “I promise”, etc.); in addition, the 
cognitive processes of keying and anchoring are often supposed to grasp the intention 
and context in which a particular token-level sentence is uttered, thus providing its 
interpretation.
21
 The above-mentioned linguistic exchange regarding the policeman and 
the thief illustrates the dynamics of such interpretation. 
 
Fifth, because of their subject-predicate ordering, propositions are capable of tasks 
other than that of making a truth-claim. The topical subject can be actual, virtual or 
non-verifiable, a feature which is extremely important for constructing religious 
language.
22
 When a theist and an atheist interpret the Bible, they can agree on the 
                                                 
21
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semantics of biblical language in spite of the fact that one interpreter considers God to 
be actual and the other virtual. Moreover, because the topical subject is a “something” 
which is elucidated through higher-order predicates, the subject can be mysterious or 
hidden. This is a very common feature in learning the meaning of words and things. If 
somebody has never heard the word “badminton”, others can elucidate this topical 
subject by referring to higher-order predicates: it is a ballgame with two players; you 
need a racket and a net, etc. Often the topical subject can remain mysterious: you can 
speak about sea-urchins and hobbits without knowing what they are or whether there 
are such things. In Seuren’s semantics, the postulate of a cognitive framework of the 
human mind alleviates the philosophical problems which result from dealing with 
virtual and non-verifiable entities.
23
 
 
Sixth, in some sense the topical subjects always remain mysterious in the sense of 
inexhaustibility. If I ask: “Who is John?” and you answer: “John is a university 
professor, father of two children, he likes jogging and eating hamburgers, etc.”, there 
does not seem to be any logical end in assigning meaningful properties to the topical 
subject. The socially binding forces of speech-acts set pragmatic limits of 
communication, but in principle one can always say new things about the topical 
subject in question.  This means that propositions are epistemically open-ended and 
inexhaustible: rather than mirroring a factual or virtual reality, they construct sets of 
properties which aim at elucidating the topical subject from some perspective.
24
 At the 
same time, other properties remain hidden although they might be as relevant as the 
                                                                                                                                              
religious language. 
23
 I do not mean that religious sentences would be merely virtual but rather that 
their truth-value remains non-verifiable. With the postulate of a creative mind, the 
cognitive-realist view of language preserves this openness. Assuming a cognitive basis 
for religious sentences does not, however, contribute to their truth-value. One should 
therefore remain careful in developing this idea towards anticipation (cf. Wolfhart 
PANNENBERG, Systematische Theologie 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht,1988), 58-72) or a God-given conformity with Christ (cf. MARSHALL (see 
above n. 1), 265-272). My approach combines cognitivism with a rule theory of 
doctrine, as will be argued below. What can be cognitively grounded is not, however, 
the final truth of doctrine but its regularity. 
24
 This idea is to some extent taken from Jaakko HINTIKKA, Lingua Universalis 
vs. Rationalis Calculator: An Ultimate Presupposition of Twentieth-Century 
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assigned ones. In this sense, some properties always escape the propositional 
description, leaving it dialogical and inexhaustible. 
 
Looking at these six features from the theological angle, we can even maintain that all 
doctrine has been transmitted to us in the form of sentences. The sentences contain L-
propositions and traces of socially binding forces. In encountering religion, every 
theologian and probably every religious person first encounters spoken and written 
sentences. Religious behaviour may not even emerge in any other way than through the 
elucidation provided by the sentences. That is to say, while visual representations or 
social practices could also be claimed to prompt religion, cognitively developed 
animals can look at such representations or live in a religious environment without 
becoming themselves the least religious. Although the matter is very complex, the 
approach put forward in this paper proceeds from the view of language as the primary 
source of religiosity. Such a sentential and cognitive explanation of religious beliefs 
creates a counterpoint to those theories of cultural and social practice which dominate 
the postliberal scene.
25
 The programme of reclaiming the sentences nevertheless 
assumes the presence of socially binding forces already on the semantic level. 
 
Postliberal theory maintains that doctrines first become meaningful when they are 
embedded in social and cultural practices. From this claim some writers draw the 
conclusion that the tradition of the church needs to be assumed, and often in a fairly 
traditionalist fashion. 
26
 Seuren’s semantic framework revises this assumption: if 
sentences contain both the proposition and the socially binding force, the reader is 
invited to find them both already in the text. She does not need to bring the Bible to the 
church to understand it, but she can grasp both the propositional content and the 
socially binding forces when she reads the text carefully. The forces discussed are not 
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the primacy of language in a way that is often neglected in both progressive and 
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something in addition to the text, a context, a usage or a separate pragmatics – they are 
present in the token-level sentences and required in their adequate interpretation.  
 
A reader of Peter Lombard’s Sententiae, for instance, does not actually grasp this 
medieval textbook
27
 as a series of abstract and timeless propositions, but in reading this 
work he constantly employs the type-token distinction and recognizes the speech-acts 
created as questions, commands, promises, etc. He probably also comprehends the 
partially overlapping different intents of various authors: when Lombard quotes 
Augustine’s Pelagian controversies, the medieval author might have a slightly different 
aim (Lombard’s textbook intent) than his ancient source (Augustine’s intent to refute 
heresies), but these intents also overlap considerably. Both Augustine and Lombard can 
employ the same L-propositions, although they may anchor them differently. Doctrinal 
sentences are, therefore, both flexible (they can be anchored and keyed differently) and 
stable (they continue to employ the same L-proposition).  
 
The interplay of topical subjects and commenting predicates enables a particularly rich 
variety of dialogical possibilities: when the textbook says that “Pelagians have the 
properties x, y and z”, and the reader knows some contemporaries who also allegedly 
have the properties x, y and z, he easily draws the conclusion that these people are also 
Pelagians. For such reasons, the Aristotelian event of  “saying something of 
something” is not rigid, monologist or limited to conveying information; for better or 
worse, it is a highly dialogical, communicative and perspectival event.
28
  
 
The Loci 
                                                                                                                                              
1), 26-30 and 155-165 discusses this feature in more detail.  
27
 For this work, see Philipp ROSEMANN, The Story of a Great Medieval Book: 
Peter Lombard’s Sentences (Peterborough: Broadview, 2007). 
28
 Although much of this is compatible with Vanhoozer’s “canonical-linguistic” 
programme, I find his “postpropositionalism” (VANHOOZER, Drama  (see above n. 1), 
266-278) exaggerated. While I have sympathy with his notions of “cognitive-poetic 
imagination” (Drama, 278-181) and “communicative practice” (Drama, 226; see also 
the communicative theism of VANHOOZER, Remythologizing (see above n. 8), 79-294), 
my own approach aims to present the linguistic issues with less colourful but hopefully 
more precise terminology. 
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Although the medieval tradition of Sententiae could be connected with my quest, more 
adequate historical models are provided by Erasmus of Rotterdam and Philip 
Melanchthon. They introduce the functional use of the loci method and combine it with 
their moderate understanding of sola scriptura. With “moderate understanding” I mean 
a view which is not hostile to ecclesial tradition but claims that one can learn the basic 
intents and socially binding forces of Christianity already from the Scripture. 
According to such a view, reading the Bible in itself equips the reader with an 
understanding of the social and ecclesial practices embedded in scriptural sentences. 
Such a “Protestant turn” runs parallel to my concern to reformulate the linguistic 
approach to doctrine.  
 
Even more important for the approach launched in this paper is the loci method, which 
establishes the missing link between linguistics and the theory of doctrine. This method 
has often been considered as trivial, that is, as a way of organizing the different points 
of doctrine in a pedagogical or mnemotechnical manner. One can certainly trivialize 
the loci method, but Erasmus and Melanchthon cannot be blamed for such a move. 
These two authors perform a “linguistic turn” from Scholastics to Humanism; their 
views will also serve as my guides and handmaids in the quest for a fresh linguistic 
approach to doctrine. 
 
The concept of topos / locus stems from Aristotle’s theory of argumentation and the 
rhetorical tradition.
29
 Erasmus connects both traditions in his claim that good speech, 
constructed around the most important loci, needs to imitate the order of nature and its 
organic plans. God has accommodated the divine word to human speech; in this 
accommodation, Christ becomes the goal or purpose, the scopus, around which 
theological loci are to be organized. At the same time, the systemic and natural 
elements of speech also remain valid: therefore, theological speech can be composed 
around a number of the most important loci in a manner which resembles other 
                                                 
29
 For an overview, see O. PRIMAVESI et al., ‘Topik, Topos’, Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Philosophie 10 (1998), 1263-1288. 
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speeches. The loci need to be taken from the Bible and arranged around the scopus, 
Christ.
30
  
 
The loci thus allow the reader or listener to grasp the organizing principles of a given 
text or speech. Through the loci, the speaker’s intent can be elucidated. At the same 
time, the loci and the speech around them follow the order of nature. This order is 
familiar to the reader, creating a bridgehead from which the listener can step in to the 
intended world of the speaker. In his Ratio verae theologiae (1518), a methodological 
text attached to his Greek New Testament, Erasmus advises the reader of biblical books 
to collate “theological loci in which you place everything you read as if in certain little 
nests”. The reader can further arrange these topics in organic or systematic 
relationships according to their similarities and differences. Through this procedure, all 
significant features of different biblical books can be highlighted in the manner they 
deserve.
31
 
 
Erasmus thus distinguishes between three domains: (i) the scopus of all theological 
speech, Christ, (ii) the loci, the organizing principles or nests, and (iii) everything else 
notable in the Bible that should be assigned to the nests.  Following this method, the 
reader should make his heart “a library of Christ”. When the biblical text is organized 
in this manner, the loci become sources from which all true theology originates.
32
 
Erasmus thus downgrades all post-biblical theology to a fourth domain. On this domain 
(iv), true theology reflects its biblical origins, while false theology cannot claim these 
origins. 
 
Significant in this methodology is the differentiation between four cognitive orders or 
domains. The biblical language moves on domains (ii) and (iii), consisting of nests or 
loci (ii) in connection with their various properties (iii), which are assigned to their 
particular nests. The organized linguistic totality of (ii) and (iii) points towards the final 
                                                 
30
 Manfred HOFFMANN, Rhetoric and Theology: The Hermeneutic of Erasmus 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 211-212. 
31
 ERASMUS, Ausgewählte Schriften 3 (Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchgesellschaft, 
1990), 64-67, HOFFMANN (see above n. 30), 37. 
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goal and purpose, Christ. Immediately before his presentation of loci, Erasmus outlines 
the teaching or doctrine of Christ.
33
 There he focuses on the life and acts of Christ (i) 
rather than any theoretical doctrine; this underlying and primary circulus et orbis 
Christi
34
 defines the scopus which is then elucidated by means of biblical loci (ii) and 
other biblical texts (iii) assigned to various loci like eggs in nests. The nests (ii) and 
their contents (iii) are not merely pedagogical structures, but they make visible the 
natural and divine order which proceeds from (i) to (ii), (iii) and (iv). The nests do not 
make up an additive catalogue, but they are organized like a dynamic ecosystem with 
its careful balance of natural and divine order. The domains (ii) and (iii) also reflect the 
subject-predicate order of language: the topics or loci are elucidated and commented on 
by means of the texts assigned to them. The nests and their contents are thus not only 
elements of speech but they also become constituents of cognitive phenomena. 
 
Philip Melanchthon develops Erasmus’s view in his Loci communes of 1521. He lays 
great value on the nature of cognition in grasping the biblical loci. Like Erasmus, 
Melanchthon does not consider Christ as one locus among others, but Christ institutes 
and makes known the various loci which are Christi doctrina. This “form” of 
Christianity needs to be collected from the canonical Scriptures. The loci lead to the 
scopus.
35
 For both Erasmus and Melanchthon, the concepts of locus and scopus are 
closely connected to each other and both can exemplify doctrina.  Simplifying their 
usage to an extent, we may say that while locus is the linguistic and cognitive concept 
which can be used of various subject terms, scopus is the one goal to be reached, 
normally summarized as and identified with Christ. 
 
Melanchthon adds to his Erasmian scheme a hermeneutical rule saying that Christ 
wants us to know in particular the Pauline concepts of sin, grace, law and gospel. The 
“higher” points of doctrine, like the Trinity and the two natures of Christ, remain 
mysteries which are to be adored rather than understood.  This attitude does not imply 
                                                                                                                                              
32
 ERASMUS (see above n. 31), 68. 
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 ERASMUS (see above n. 31), 60,6. 
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 Philipp MELANCHTHON, Loci communes 1521 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher 
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any contempt of higher doctrines, but it is meant as a warning that it is extremely 
difficult to speak of these properly. Christ is known (cognoscitur) through the loci of 
sin, law and grace, because knowing Christ means knowing his gifts and services to 
humankind. When Paul wrote Romans, he focused on these loci and did not write 
much about the Trinity or the Incarnation. These Melanchthonian remarks should be 
read as hermeneutical, meaning that the biblical speech is constructed around such loci 
which contain accessible cognitive power. In his textbook Melanchthon aims at 
explaining the meaning of these main topics (rationem eorum locorum).
36
 
  
Like Erasmus, Melanchthon operates with an organic grasp of different domains: there 
is, first, the divine mystery which should be adored and studied through focusing on 
Christ as the cognitive scopus; second, one needs to focus on the most common biblical 
loci (loci communes) which reach out to Christ. These receive biblical predicates 
which, as a third domain, establish a canonical understanding of the loci. The human 
words of the interpreters constitute the fourth domain; they may or may not follow the 
biblical speech. In this outline, the second domain of loci contains the cognitive 
potential of biblical speech. But also the third domain, the totality of biblical speech, is 
important, as “God does all his works through his speech”.37 This maxim establishes a 
truly linguistic view of doctrine, a view in which the speech-act and the propositional 
content converge. Used properly, such a view may lead towards a new dawn of biblical 
narrative rather than its eclipse. 
 
The Model 
 
Although the following “linguistic loci approach to doctrine” employs ideas from 
Seuren, Erasmus and Melanchthon, it very consciously aims at being a model standing 
on its own feet. The linguistic and historical guides discussed above provide some 
background, but they are not to be held responsible for what follows. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
Verlagshaus, 1993), 12,4; 14,8; 16:1. 
36
 MELANCHTHON (see above n. 35), 18; 22; 24. 
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Let us assume that we have received a text with many valuable teachings. In reading it, 
we detect a number of key issues which can be called the topical subjects of this text. 
These become the loci which we employ as the organizing principles. Other linguistic 
items in the text are related to the loci as predicates relate to the subject: they elucidate 
the topical subject and assign various properties to it.  To elucidate the topical subject, 
the predicates need to be understood according to their ordinary semantics. In other 
words, the lexical meanings available through the L-proposition as well as the 
contextual anchoring and the intentional keying of individual sentences are essential in 
the interpretation of the text. 
 
This process of interpretation is conditioned by the assumption that the topical subjects, 
the loci, emerge from and point towards the hidden mysteries of religion. Their 
intentional keying and contextual anchoring extends beyond our ordinary cognition. In 
some sense, they remain “strange” even after elucidation through predicates. This 
phenomenon can be interpreted in various ways. A Barthian-minded theologian might 
say that this is and should be the nature of God-given revelation. A naturalist-minded 
cognitive scientist would rather maintain that the dynamics of folk psychology creates 
supernatural agents to fill the cognitive lacunas; their strangeness marks the non-
standard character of such an entity. A theory of doctrine can, however, leave such 
foundational issues undiscussed for a while. 
 
The topical subjects constitute a distinct semantic class in religious language: while 
their final lexical meanings remain strange or hidden from ordinary cognition, they are 
also elucidated through the assignment of a number of ordinary predicates to them. By 
means of this process they receive meanings, for instance: God is omnipotent, father, 
and creator. The interpretation of these meanings is, however, open-ended and 
incomplete. While God may resemble a father, the totality of assigned predicates also 
shows that God is very different from ordinary fathers. Thus the set of predicates 
provides for the anchoring and keying of the topical subject only to some extent. The 
topical subject remains anchored and keyed to the mystery, although its meaning is 
elucidated through the predicates. 
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We may deal with the strangeness of religious topical subjects by saying that they have 
only one “hand” that stretches towards mystery. The predicates of religious sentences 
have two hands: one that marks the assignment to a given topical subject and another 
that connects the predicate with the ordinary discourse relevant for the understanding 
of this predicate. If we take the linguistic universe of the Bible as the collection of 
relevant sentences, we obtain the same four domains of linguistic entities which appear 
in Erasmus and Melanchthon: (i) the hidden objects, the scopus which remains a 
cognitive mystery, (ii) the topical subjects of biblical language, the loci pointing to the 
mystery and scopus, (iii) the biblical predicates which elucidate the subject by means 
of ordinary language and collect various themes under the same title like eggs in a nest, 
(iv) the rest of ordinary language, the cognitive resource which allows ordinary readers 
and listeners to understand all sentences with their subjects and predicates. These four 
domains resemble the lower and higher orders of linguistic subjects and predicates in 
the sense that (i) depict the lowest and (iv) the highest order. While the higher orders 
are supposed to elucidate the lower ones, the lower orders remain the primary 
constituents of religious understanding. 
 
We can illustrate the dynamics of this linguistic universe with a figure in which the 
“hands” are represented by arrows. The boundaries between the four domains can be 
visualized with different lines: while the veil between (i) and (ii) remains impermeable, 
the boundaries between (ii) and (iii) as well as between (iii) and (iv) are porous. The 
domains (ii) and (iii) constitute the biblical language of the canon. Most of this canon, 
namely all predicates (iii), is in cognitive communication with the entire resource of 
language (iv). Some designated terms are understood as topical subjects (ii); they are 
only elucidated by the rest of the canon (iii). Due to their assumed connection with the 
mystery, they contain an aspect of otherness or strangeness. Their meaning is not 
defined by the entire resource (iv), but only by the canonical predicates (iii). Thus the 
doctrinal sentences of a canon follow the pattern: subject (ii) + predicate (iii). In this 
manner we obtain the following Figure 1: 
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The  model outlined here operates with sentences rather than propositions and 
considers doctrines to be linguistic (sentential) rather than mental (propositional) 
entities. At the same time, the variegated cognitive understanding of sentences remains 
important. The sentences need to be seen in terms of L-propositions as well as in terms 
of contextual anchoring and intentional keying of their linguistic shapes. The 
propositional form has been deconstructed so that the topical subject (ii) is constituted 
differently from its predicates (iii). As the topical subject remains connected with 
otherness (i), the domain of predicates is primarily responsible for the cognitive 
understanding of doctrinal sentences. This domain is open to historical-critical and 
other rational means of semantic inquiry.  The identification of the domain of loci (ii) 
makes, however, this inquiry a theory of doctrine rather than  a merely exegetical quest 
for meaning and interpretation.  
 
Given this, the obvious question is: who decides which terms in a canon are to be 
assumed as topical subjects (ii) rather than ordinary predicates (iii)? There is no easy or 
   
 Fig. 1: A Linguistic Loci Approach to Doctrine 
 
hidden reality              revealed/ given language            ordinary language 
                              (rule of systemic order)        (predicate restriction rule) 
 
 
                                      eusebeia                     moderation, contentment   
 
Trinity                             church                           temple, body, household             ordinary discourse, 
(distant)                                                                                                                     phenomenal world 
 
                   Christ           Jesus Christ                     Lord, gate for the sheep             lords, gates,  
                (proximate)                                                                                                  windows etc. 
Creation                           kingdom of God             treasure hidden in field 
                                                                                 merchant searching pearls              stories 
                     net to catch fishes                           narratives 
 
 
i mysteries  (scopus)       ii loci  (topical subjects)   iii predicates                          iv human language 
                                                                     canonical  
                                                                                                              common sense  
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straightforward answer to this question, but the following guidelines can be given: the 
loci should follow and also reveal the natural order of the text. This means that they 
cannot be constructed at will but that the text presupposes a systemic order through 
which one finds the constitutive concepts and their final scopus. A religious text 
normally reveals an ascending order: it stretches from the ordinary and perceivable 
world (iii+iv) towards a more abstract, invisible and maybe even ineffable domain (i).
38
 
The topical subjects (ii) are, therefore, terms which organize the flow of the text 
towards such goals. 
 
The topical subjects do not contain any such innate properties in themselves that would 
make them loci.  Their “strangeness” may provide some clue for identification, but one 
should not assume that non-standard uses in themselves reveal a topical subject. The 
loci are “constructed” in the sense that the entire systemic order of the text has them 
appear as its “natural” centers of gravity. In this sense we can speak of the self-
emergence of loci. 
 
Logically speaking, all lexical words are predicates in the L-propositional level: they 
assign properties or relations to entities.
39
 The sentence “Jesus Christ is the Lord” 
assigns the property of lordship as well as the name “Jesus Christ” to the relevant 
entity. Semantically, however, names like “Jesus Christ” can be treated as topical 
subjects and assignments like “the Lord” as predicates (cf. Figure 1). This means that 
the loci are names or labels pointing to the entity or representing it in the linguistic 
universe. Theoretically, such names could also be treated as first-order predicates 
attached to the underlying zero-order mystery on domain (i). The distinction between 
domains (ii) and (iii) is, therefore, not absolute or ontological, but it results from the 
systemic organization of the linguistic universe.  
 
Historically, many doctrinal texts are organized in this manner. The Apostle’s Creed 
can be read as three articles, the topical subjects representing God, Jesus Christ and the 
                                                 
38
 The metaphor of ”ascending” assumes that (i) and (ii), though logically 
lower-order entities than (iii) and (iv), are higher as the goal of the process. 
39
 See SEUREN, Cognition (see above n. 3), 289. 
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Holy Spirit. In Westminster Confession, the title of each article names the topical 
subject, and the text of the article elucidates the title through assigning various 
predicates to it. At the same time, these “nests” do not make up a merely additive list, 
but they constitute a systemic order in which the elucidations may employ the 
resources of other loci and the same predicates can be assigned to various loci. Given 
the existence of such a systemic order, one can organize a biblical text around a 
number of assumed loci in the manner of Erasmus. Let us label this procedure “the rule 
of systemic order”. To call it a rule means that the organizing principle is not only 
natural but also intentionally constructed order. 
 
The answer to the question “who decides the loci?” is thus found in the complex 
interplay of natural and constructed features of language. In reading a historical text, 
the reader cannot simply decide what the text is speaking about.  The author has 
already made his own choices, and the readers need to adapt themselves to the scopus 
and the loci present in the text. We may even speculate how much the author has 
decided or constructed and to what extent he is reporting the order which has been 
made available to him by nature or by some previous agents. At the same time, 
however, the reader of the text is not merely a passive recipient but she also interprets 
the sentences. This interpretation occurs through the predicates, but the loci remain 
fairly stable, as they constitute the fixed points of what the text is speaking about. The 
rule of systemic order with its centers of gravity is, therefore, not a mere construction 
of the reader but it depends on the author’s cognition and intent. 
 
This answer does not mean that the readers could not debate the status and relative 
importance of some loci. While there can be little doubt, for instance, that the New 
Testament speaks about Christ, one can debate the extent to which “the church” is a 
constitutive locus of the New Testament as a whole or of some parts of it. The loci 
should emerge from the texts “naturally” rather than be imposed on them. In addition, 
some loci are constitutive of partial units rather than of the entire text. The precise 
number and status of loci is thus not absolute. On the other hand, a meaningful and 
influential text probably contains some fairly stable and coherent loci which connect 
the entire text to its alleged scopus, creating the rule of systemic order. 
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If we approve the postulate of stable and coherent loci available in doctrinal texts, the 
next question is: what is the added value of seeing doctrinal sentences in terms of 
topical subjects and explanatory predicates?  We may identify three such added values. 
First, this approach allows seeing the interplay of identity and difference, 
understanding and ineffability. When God is called “father, omnipotent, creator”, 
something is being understood. At the same time, these assignments by no means 
exhaust the meaning of the subject term. Rather than mirroring reality or capturing the 
meaning, the subject-predicate order of sentences formulates a number of perspectival 
accounts without claiming to give a total description of the locus elucidated in this 
manner. Something can be understood, but the ineffable mystery nevertheless remains 
the moving power of religious imagination. 
 
Second, the loci approach assumes that concrete texts do not consist of propositional 
types. As a group of token sentences, a text bears witness to the speech-acts which, 
through the processes of keying and anchoring, can be interpreted to reflect the socially 
binding forces and authorial intents at stake. The process of such interpretation is the 
daily work of historical-critical exegesis. While postliberal approaches tend to be 
indifferent of or even hostile to exegetical methods, the loci approach encourages the 
quest for historical and social interpretations by means of anchoring and keying the 
texts with historical speech-acts and socially binding forces. Such a quest does not, 
however, entail a reduction to these features, as they work in connection with universal 
L-propositions. While postliberals often locate the speech-act theory to the realm of 
textual pragmatics, the loci approach considers speech-acts to be semantic components 
of the token-level sentences. This insight is optimistic with regard to the resources of  
historical exegesis: it assumes that petrified doctrinal sentences may still contain traces 
of the socially binding forces of the first Christians,  like an ancient organism may 
preserve information about its own past. The speech-acts need not, therefore, be 
imposed on these texts by later ecclesial traditions and practices, but they remain 
constitutive parts of the token-level sentences. 
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A third added value can be seen in the integration of the cognitive dimension into a 
linguistic approach to doctrine. While postliberal theories tend to see doctrinal 
meanings primarily in terms of de facto uses and narrative practices, the loci model is 
more willing to grant a communicative potential to the sentences in themselves. The 
doctrinal sentences employ an L-proposition which is a necessary but not sufficient 
part of the interpretation of the sentence. Through seeing the universal L-proposition in 
connection with the occasional processes of keying and anchoring, the creative mind 
can construct an abundant variety of interpretations. The token sentences constructed in 
such cognitive interpretation processes need not have a truth-value in the positivist 
sense of the term. People can even have different opinions about truth-values and 
nevertheless imagine and discuss an issue coherently: for instance, a theist and an 
atheist can debate an exegetical matter competently in this way. The assumption of a 
creative mind with cognitive capacity thus helps to understand the richness of religious 
linguistic universes.  
 
In presupposing the cognitive capacity, we may even speculate whether the domain of 
mystery is in some way available to the cognition. Erasmus seems to think that the 
“life-circle of Christ” in a way shines through the veil of mystery. Melanchthon 
assumes that some mysteries, like the Trinity, remain distant, while others, like the 
work of Christ, are proximate.  The reluctance of postliberal approaches to make 
experience a theological category may in itself be sober. However, if linguistic 
approaches ignore the dimension of the creative mind with its cognitive capacity, they 
may fail to account for the richness of doctrinal elaboration in its interplay of language 
and cognition.
40
   
 
Given this, it is nevertheless also important to see that the loci approach does not aim at 
a cognitive reduction of doctrines. As the loci point to the mystery, their meaning is to 
some extent different from their non-topical homonymous counterparts. Because of this 
difference, they remain strange in their relationship to the cognitive resources of 
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language. The kingdom of God, for instance, remains different from worldly kingdoms 
in Jesus’ proclamation. In its topical and theological sense the term “kingdom”, 
basileia, is employed “catachrestically”, that is, it is intentionally misused.41 The 
peculiar uses and misuses of the term create its non-standard understanding; such 
otherness is finally justified by the ineffable subject matter. The “one-handedness” of 
the loci in Figure 1 is another way of saying that, as core terms of religious doctrine, 
the topical subjects are employed catachrestically. One may say, therefore, that the 
canonical uses of loci are particularly important for their understanding. Religious 
language “baptizes” certain concepts by means of catachresis, increasing their relative 
importance and bringing them to a lower order (from iii to ii), closer to the mystery.  
The non-standard use of the loci terms, their strangeness, reflects the cognitive 
ineffability of their subject matter. At the same time, one cannot use too many concepts 
catachrestically. Most concepts need to be understood by means of ordinary cognition, 
since otherwise the sentences cannot be understood at all. 
 
In addition to the rule of systemic order, the linguistic loci approach contains another 
rule, which organizes the reader’s cognition on the borderline between (iii) and (iv). If 
canonical doctrines are formulated as sentences employing topical subjects (ii) and 
predicates (iii), a community using this canon can argue that these sentences should 
also regulate all religious speech of community members in domain (iv). If religious 
speech in domain (iv) significantly deviates from the patterns present in sentences 
consisting of (ii) and (iii), it can be considered as problematic. To do this, the 
community need not have full cognitive access to normative sentences but it is enough 
to have this rule.  
 
Let us, for instance, examine two sentences: (a) “Christ is the gate” and (b) “Christ is 
the window”. Since (a) can be derived from John 10:7 but (b) does not belong to the 
canonical language (its predicate being in domain iv), (b) can be considered as being 
problematic. In such a consideration, the community need not know in which cognitive 
sense the topical subject resembles gates but not windows. The community can be 
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content with the rule-based view that only sentences consisting of domains (ii) and (iii) 
provide access to the mystery. Although this access may contain cognitive features 
(e.g. the gate enables a transition to a new space), the status of a given sentence as 
doctrine is defined by the rule (a is canonical, b is not) rather than its cognitive 
interpretation (one cannot claim, e.g., that windows also enable transitions).  We may 
call this condition “the predicate restriction rule”. 
 
This result entails a corollary stating that the predicate restriction rule does not apply to 
sentences consisting of (iii) and (iv) in the same manner. It is perfectly legitimate to 
say, for instance, that “the gate (iii) in John 10:7 means transition to a new space (iv)”, 
because the domain (iii) is supposed to be cognitive and not catachrestic. Even very 
conservative and Biblicist religious communities allow the interpretation of biblical 
predicates in this manner. At the same time, many religious communities restrict 
interpretative leaps from (ii) to (iv), thus applying the predicate restriction rule. Such 
observations may provide some evidence for an intuitive use of the linguistic loci 
approach to doctrine in religious communities.
 42
 
 
In sum, the model presented here assumes that the cognition of religious sentences 
occurs through a set of four orders or domains. The sentences are grasped properly by 
means of distinguishing adequately between their subjects and predicates. The most 
important topical subjects establish loci, connection points with the mystery of faith. 
The cognitive elements are conditioned by two rules, the rule of systemic order and the 
predicate restriction rule. While the rule of systemic order establishes the borderline 
between (ii) and (iii), the predicate restriction rule safeguards the boundary between 
(iii) and (iv). George Lindbeck sometimes makes a distinction between the cultural-
linguistic “approach” and rule “theory”.43 In terms of such a distinction, the model 
outlined here exemplifies a linguistic loci approach. Because it employs four cognitive 
                                                                                                                                              
Geheimnis der Welt, 5. Aufl. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986), 401. 
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domains and two basic rules, it could be labeled as “cognitive rule theory”. The present 
paper speaks, however, in terms of approach rather than full-fledged theory.  
 
Exegetics 
 
A linguistic loci approach to doctrine need not be limited to an exposition of biblical 
content.
44
 As this is, however, the background of the views of Erasmus and 
Melanchthon, and as the contemporary discussion on the theological interpretation of 
the Bible is closely connected with linguistic theories, we will also focus on this 
dimension. The loci approach provides rich opportunities to integrate exegetical and 
doctrinal work, because it presupposes both universal doctrinal meanings (L-
propositions) and particular historical and social interpretations of biblical sentences 
(keyed and anchored tokens). 
 
Many current proponents of the theological interpretation of the Bible want to provide 
alternative ways of reading the Scripture. In practice, however, linguistic, canonical 
and speech-act theories have not produced substantial exegetical results. Often these 
theories remain on a highly philosophical level, and when they present biblical 
interpretations, they offer little more than a traditional sermon. The new Brazos 
Theological Commentary of the Bible is an exciting laboratory in this respect. The 
volumes published thus far are innovative in showing how an author relates his own 
theology to the biblical material.
45
 The exegetical performance of these commentaries 
has, however, remained meager. Moreover, the volumes are very different not only 
from exegetical commentaries but also from each other; no general profile of 
“theological interpretation” can be seen to emerge. The “canonical” or “theological” 
pre-understanding of the authors does not provide concrete patterns of interpretation. 
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On the liberal scene we can detect a reverse dynamics: while the authors provide very 
radical and innovative interpretations of individual texts, the general outline of their 
New Testament theologies follows traditional patterns. Heikki Räisänen’s The Rise of 
Christian Beliefs is an example of this dynamics. The work programmatically develops 
a non-confessional, academic presentation of the “thought world” of early Christians. 
In this project, many individual texts are treated in a highly innovative and non-
theological manner, but the chapter titles still exemplify the traditional loci of the New 
Testament: sin, the human condition, eschatology, salvation, Jesus Christ as mediator, 
the Spirit, Jewish and Christian identity.
46
 
 
Seen from the perspective of the loci approach, the following explanatory remarks 
could be made on the basis of these observations: A consistently liberal academic 
exegesis may be very innovative in domains (iii) and (iv), but since the topical subjects 
(ii) are already assumed by the text, even very critical scholars who are committed to 
fair play and common sense find more or less the same set of loci in the text. In this 
limited sense one could even say that the Scripture elucidates and interprets itself. On 
the other hand, postliberal, canonical and ecclesial interpreters want to remain true to 
the great tradition of the church. They also keep the same loci (ii) and do not want to 
question the received understanding of biblical predicates (iii). This attitude makes 
their exegesis somewhat tedious and may motivate them to bypass uninteresting 
historical discussions.  
 
To make their exposition more exciting, these interpreters apply philosophical or other 
speculative ideas on the domain of post-biblical and post-exegetical ecclesial 
considerations (iv). Because such considerations do not concern the actual semantic 
content of biblical speech (ii+iii), they remain personal theologies of the interpreters. 
The postliberal authors clearly do not violate the rule-based restriction that all human 
interpretation (iv) should be compatible with canonical sentences (ii+iii); thus their 
expositions are unproblematically biblical. The authors are not, however, so much 
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expounding the Bible as interpreting other issues (philosophical, linguistic, and 
cultural) in harmony with biblical witness.
47
  
 
The loci approach is more courageous in this respect, since it prompts the expositor to 
tackle with all the exegetical problems and opportunities available in domain (iii). In 
the loci approach, the speech-acts are not understood to concern the later reception and 
use of the texts but the actual semantics of biblical sentences. Therefore the social 
binding and contextual anchoring of the texts is not a matter of later tradition but of the 
immediate circumstances and the author’s intent. In addition to the type-related or 
“typological” meaning of the biblical sentences, available as L-propositions, the loci 
theorists may claim that they can present a viable interpretation of the sentences on the 
basis of token-related traces available in the historical text. This process of 
interpretation is basically exegetical. It does not necessarily lead into a non-ecclesial 
understanding, since many, perhaps most, New Testament authors in fact do have an 
ecclesial intent.
48
 The historical authors may also, however, have other intents, and 
these can be spelled out by means of careful exegetical analysis. Such a procedure 
identifies the occasional speech-acts marked in token sentences and interprets them to 
be anchored in particular contexts. 
 
My own commentary in the Brazos series is a programmatic attempt to present an 
exposition which combines detailed exegetical analysis with consistent theological 
interpretation.
49
 While my postscript to this commentary already outlines the loci 
approach very briefly,
50
 the present paper has attempted to give a fuller methodological 
discussion, embedding the approach in a current view of linguistic semantics. As the 
last part of the present paper, some concrete examples may illustrate this attempt.  
                                                 
47
 For such a project, see Hans FREI (The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). 
48
 The Old Testament / Jewish Bible offers an example of the limits of the loci 
approach. While the Brazos series shows that it is possible to read the Old Testament in 
the light of Christian theology, the problem of natural vs. imposed loci must be solved 
in such a project. 
49
 Risto SAARINEN, The Pastoral Epistles with Philemon and Jude, Grand 
Rapids: Brazos, 2008. 
50
 SAARINEN (see above n. 49), 225-232. 
  
27 
 
The Pastoral Epistles are strongly marked by Paul’s critical discussion with the so-
called false teachers. Although we do not know for sure who they were, the text offers 
an abundance of occasional sentences which can be contextually anchored and 
intentionally keyed with some probability. My exposition provides for this anchoring 
and keying through claiming that both Paul and his opponents employ the vocabulary 
of Hellenistic therapeutic philosophy. When Paul refutes his opponents with the help of 
this vocabulary, his main concepts, the topical subjects of the Pastoral Epistles, 
perform a double move or even a twofold catachresis between the kerygmatic world of 
Jerusalem and the philosophical world of Athens.
51
 
 
Typical loci of this kind are ekklesia, the church, and eusebeia, godliness or piety (see 
Figure 1). The first catachresis of ekklesia occurs when it is brought from “Athens” to 
“Jerusalem”: it is no longer a meeting of the city-state, but a gathering of the faithful. 
In the second catachresis, ekklesia again approaches the world. When the predicates of 
oikos and oikonomia are assigned to the church (e.g. 2 Tim. 2:20), this household 
vocabulary relates it to Hellenistic ideals, sometimes expressed philosophically as 
oikeiosis, familiarization or sociability.  Through the double catachresis, the church 
remains a locus pointing to the mystery, but through its many predicates it is also 
introduced to outsiders and critically compared with their ideals.
52
 
 
A similar double move concerns eusebeia. This Hellenistic concept of “civil piety” is 
in the Pastoral Epistles launched as the virtue of Christian community. Thus it is 
employed catachrestically, that is, differently from its Hellenistic homonymic 
counterpart. But when Paul teaches that godliness is contentment and moderation (1 
Tim 6:6-10) he attaches the vocabulary of Athens to this Christian virtue, pointing out 
that while Christian piety differs from the piety of outsiders, it also displays their 
virtues in its particular manner.
53
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Through organizing Paul’s discussion around such topical subjects the commentary 
aims at taking very seriously the exegetical discussion. At the same time, the 
commentary performs a systematic and theological exposition of the text. This task 
presupposes the understanding of Pauline sentences in terms of subject-predicate order 
as well as the keying and anchoring of these sentences to their particular historical 
background.  The purpose of such contextualization is not a cognitive or contextual 
reduction. The typological L-propositions do not lose their universality when they are 
keyed and anchored in this manner. They are seen in terms of concrete sentences rather 
than as propositions which rigidly mirror a reality. Linguistically, sentences aim at 
elucidating the topical subject with the help of their predicates and various other token-
like features. The loci approach to doctrine aims at capturing this basic elucidation 
rather than saving the propositions.  When this approach reclaims the sentences as 
building blocks of doctrine, it wants to focus on the topical subjects and the mysteries 
pointed at through them. 
 
The final scopus of doctrine has been called “mystery” for two reasons, first, because 
this is the term employed in Melanchthon’s Loci communes, and second, to underline 
that the cluster of predicates never “exhausts” the meaning of the topical subject. 
Sentences and propositions are by nature perspectival, as they elucidate the locus from 
certain angles. There always remains a surplus of meaning to be sought. Biblical 
sentences are privileged vehicles of approaching the mystery, as they provide the rules 
on which religious cognition can be grounded.  
 
SUMMARY:  
While many current linguistic approaches to theological doctrine are traditionalist and 
postliberal in their outlook, there is no necessary connection between linguistic theory 
and theological traditionalism. Using contemporary semantics and the loci method of 
early modern theology, this paper outlines a new linguistic approach to doctrine. This 
“linguistic loci” approach employs cognitivism and a non-traditionalist rule theory of 
doctrine. The approach relates positively to historical-critical exegetics and claims that 
most exegetical work remains compatible with it. At the same time the linguistic loci 
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approach takes over some ideas of canonical exegesis and does not aim at a rationalist 
reduction of theological doctrine. 
 
